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HOSTILE FRENCH CIVILIANS
Benjamin B. Ferencz
The author of this article is a member of the New York Bar. At present
he is "somewhere in France." He is the author of "Army Offenders" as pub-
lished In this JOURNAL XXXIV, 4. The article in these pages gives a clear
picture of some of the penological problems that confront an army of inva.
sion.-Editor.
As the Germans retreated from French cities they left behind
them a considerable number of spies and snipers to hamper the
advance of the Allied armies. Though these enemy agents wore
civilian clothes and generally spoke fluent French they were part
of the regular German army, and could be treated by our military
authorities in accordance with well-established military precedent.
French nationals believed to be in the pay of the Germans were
turned over to the Fighting French forces of General De Gaulle
for trial and punishment by courts martial. Whenever spies or
snipers who were not French nationals were apprehended by Al-
lied Intelligence officers, military police, soldiers, or by French
civilian patriots, they were turned over to British or American
military tribunals. The initial place of confinement depended
upon the site of apprehension, and transfer was made to regular
Prisoner of War camps as soon as the military situation per-
mitted. At the Prisoner of War camps segregation was immedi-
ately instituted, and the prisoner committed to regular legal proc-
ess in accordance with military law. This procedure was not
novel, and did not in any way differ from similar situations in
previous wars or in other theatres of operation. However there
were many individuals of French nationality who were not in the
pay of the Nazi military machine yet who committed acts which
injured the Allied cause. These hostile French civilians, whether
motivated by fear, finance, or Fascist belief, presented a new
problem for Allied law-enforcement authorities.
Collaborating with the Germans was not a crime. French
civilians who obeyed German orders and complied with German
demands could not be regarded as violators of any legal precept,
even though they collaborated without reluctance. However in
very many cases of collaboration there were additional acts which
made the transgression more than morally reprehensible, and
these illegalities brought the arrest of the responsible individuals.
Among the political crimes committed by the French against
their own administration "Denunciation" was the most common.
It was a method of intimidation. A letter addressed to the local
Gestapo chief naming certain persons as members of the under-
ground, as owners of secret radios, or as being the perpetrators
of certain acts of sabotage, brought immediate reprisals. The
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Gestapo was not interested in rules of law, and even slight circum-
stances of suspicion would often result in tragic penalties.
While the Berlin-controlled Vichy government was in existence
Denunciation could not be considered a crime,-as long as the
facts stated in the charge were accurate. However a false charge
was punishable under the Fr~ench Penal Code, similar to causing a
false arrest under American law. Because the possibility was
always present that an informer might be motivated by revenge
or spite, and the denunciation might be false, local District Attor-
neys who received reports of a denunciation made a complete rec-
ord of the case. Two dossiers were prepared; one concerning the
accused, and one concerning the accuser. The Gestapo made no
effort to suppress these dossiers for they were considered part of
a District Attorney's regular duties. Whenever the denunciation
was proved to be false legal action was taken against the guilty
accuser. Imprisonment was made by the French national authori-
ties, and the trial was in conformity with pre-war French legal
standards. Wherever the denunciation was accurate no legal ac-
tion was immediately taken, but the records were kept by patri-
otic French prosecutors to be used against the collaborators
when the day of liberation arrived.
Comparatively few hostile criminal acts were committed by
those Fascist-minded Frenchmen who were not in the pay of the
Germans as spies or snipers. In most cases little time elapsed be-
tween the German flight from a city or town and the entrance of
the Allied armies. The retreating Germans took such military
steps as they could before leaving, and there was not much oppor-
tunity for sabotage by the hostile French. For the few cases of
arson, pillage, and destruction of military installations that were
committed by French civilians proper complaints were often reg-
istered with the Gendarmerie and the Agents de Police, who
treated them as ordinary civilian crimes. The action of the French
civil authorities in causing the arrest of hostile French civilians
was limited by the fact that they waited for formal complaints.
They made no special effort to prevent such crimes and did not
institute any special procedures for the apprehension of such
criminals. For the most part they lacked the facilities for insti-
gating any broad changes during the period of turbulence. How-
ever there was another group of French patriots who sought more
militant action. The members of the French Resistance forces
made very many arrests, and their actions and techniques are of
particular interest to law-enforcement agencies.
French resistance movements took many forms. In addition
to the passive resistance of the majority of the population there
were the Refractors, or the young men who evaded forced labor
in Germany by fleeing to neighboring farms, the members of the
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French Forces of the Interior, and the Maquis. The last two
groups constituted the French underground, and as soon as the
liberation began they became The Law in France.
The F.F.I. consisted of a group of patriotic young men who
banded together to fight the Nazis. They were motivated by love
of country, hatred of Fascism, lust for revenge, search for adven-
ture, or simply the desire to seek wealth in the pockets of German
dead. There was no uniformity of political belief and no set ideal
or goal except the destruction of German forces in France. The
size of resistance groups varied from twenty to two-hundred, and
the different groups were unknown to each other. They knew
their own chief who contacted other chiefs. Though there were
liaison officers to London through a central headquarters at Paris
the organization of the F.F.I. was necessarily a loose one. During
the day its members followed normal civilian pursuits, and it was
only at night that they met secretly for an attack on some Nazi
munitions convoy, camp, or depot. During the years of waiting
for their liberation the members of the F.F.I. kept careful check
on their fellow Frenchmen. They kept dossiers of their own and
had a sharp eye on the collaborators. These dossiers were trans-
mitted to a Committee of Liberation at higher headquarters,
where they were checked, filed, and all evidence consolidated.
By the time of the Allied invasion of France the members of
the underground had a very good idea as to which French civilians
could be expected to commit acts hostile to the Allied cause.
In many cases the French underground captured a town or
city days before the entrance of Allied armies. In other cases
American or British colums pushed through a region and left
the mopping-up to the Maquisards and F.F.I., who were given a
free hand. In all instances the underground had sufficient
strength to constitute a serious threat to any German pockets of
resistance. Their strength could also be used for the establish-
ment of a civil government in accordance with their own concep-
tions.
As soon as the underground entered a town or city they
started arresting suspects. The little dossiers appeared and
searches were instituted. No effort was made to use warrants
of arrest and the regular civilian authorities were not consulted.
Harlots who had cohabited with the Germans were seized, and
their hair was clipped in the public square. They were paraded
through the streets in open carts or trucks to receive the jeers
of the populace. Other females who had had commercial deal-
ings with the Nazis,-innkeepers, cafe owners, and merchants,
were accorded similar treatment. In one city of 10,000 popula-
tion over 200 women were subjected to such public shame. The
normal law-enforcement authorities generally deplored this man-
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ner of persecution, but there was nothing they could do about
it. The regular prisons were taken over by the underground
and filled with Frenchmen suspected of being too friendly with
the Nazis. The underground waited for no complaints, and
waited for no warrants. They acted as they considered best in
the interests of France.
Against those who had accurately denounced loyal French-
men, and who therefore could not be prosecuted under the Vichy
French Penal Code, the underground took drastic steps. Those
few informers who were turned over to the military authorities
for having given intelligence information to the enemy were
comparatively fortunate. Others were treated as a group of
armed and angry young men thought just.
Though the F.F.I. rendered great military assistance to the
Allied armies it was inevitable that their method of dispensing
justice would result in many abuses. The leaders of the under-
ground recognized this danger, and tried to limit it wherever
possible. The official policy of the F.F.I. was to turn all suspects
over to the elected Prefecture for legal trial and punishment
according to the accumulated evidence as soon as possible, but
the looseness of the underground organization, the heterogeneous
composition of its membership, and the confusion created by the
military situation made it practically impossible to prevent in-
justices. Allied military police generally had no evidence against
hostile Frenchmen, and such an arrest was considered beyond
their jurisdiction. The F.F.I. did not have the time, personnel,
or patience, for legal technicalities. Undoubtedly many French-
men who had not been demonstrative in their patriotism were
illegally arrested and imprisoned.
Allied Civil Affairs officers, French law-enforcement authori-
ties, and the leaders of the French underground recognized the
deplorable state of affairs, and as soon as militarily feasible,
steps were taken to remedy the situation. However in many
cases weeks passed before a workable judicial system was in-
stituted.
As soon as the Germans were routed from France the French
authorities started organizing the underground and all of French
youth into regular army units. Under the increased discipline of
the De Gaulle military regime the period of disorder was ter-
minated. All non-military arrests were left to the civil authori-
ties, and all military offenses were handled in accordance with
military law.
In every French city the situation varied, depending upon the
time elapsing between the German retreat and the entrance of
the Allied armies, the strength of the underground, and public
sentiment, but the pattern was identical. The French civilians
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who were considered hostile to the Allies did not escape punish-
ment. Though the methods employed were not always in con-
formity with ideal patterns of legal procedure there is no doubt
that they were effective and that very few hostile civilians went
undetected. The abuses that existed could hardly have been pre-
vented under the existing circumstances. They were immediately
recognized as such by all competent officials and the speed with
which they were corrected is a tribute to the efficiency of the
American, British, and French military governments.
